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Abstract
This work focuses on: (1) understanding the impact of selective forwarding at-
tacks on tree-based routing topologies in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs),
and (2) investigating cryptography-based strategies to limit network degradation
caused by sinkhole attacks. The main motivation of our research stems from the
following observations. First, WSN protocols that construct a fixed routing topol-
ogy may be significantly affected by malicious attacks. Second, considering net-
works deployed in a difficult to access geographical region, building up resilience
against such attacks rather than detection is expected to be more beneficial. We
thus first provide a simulation study on the impact of malicious attacks based on a
diverse set of parameters, such as the network scale and the position and number
of malicious nodes. Based on this study, we propose a single but very represen-
tative metric for describing this impact. Second, we present the novel design and
evaluation of two simple and resilient topology-based reconfiguration protocols
that broadcast cryptographic values. The results of our simulation study together
with a detailed analysis of the cryptographic overhead (communication, memory,
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and computational costs) show that our reconfiguration protocols are practical and
effective in improving resilience against sinkhole attacks, even in the presence of
collusion.
Key words: Wireless sensor network, selective-forwarding and sinkhole attacks,
resilience, tree-based routing protocols.
1. Introduction
The deployment of a wireless sensor network (WSN), in general, is governed
by its application. In this paper, we focus on applications, such as data collec-
tion, where a large number of static nodes need to be deployed in a difficult to
access geographical region. The general communication pattern is many-to-one:
the sensors collect and send data to sink nodes, which in turn relay the data di-
rectly to a base station outside the network. Due to the difficulty in accessing the
geographic location, the network is expected to operate for a satisfactory period
of time without any intervention. A WSN provides a lightweight infrastructure to
monitor changes remotely in hostile environments. Unfortunately, and precisely
because of the nature of such environments, a sensor network is particularly prone
to failures and, it is necessary to cope with various forms of disruptions, ranging
from battery outages to malicious attacks. Furthermore, these malicious attacks
can be as simple as propagating false information and still significantly impact
network operation, especially routing. Therefore, it is essential to quantify the
risk a network is under different type of attacks. Tackling this challenging prob-
lem constitutes the first goal of this paper.
For many applications, security (i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability
of information) is vital to the acceptance and use of sensor networks. For in-
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stance, a large set of routing protocols in WSNs are based on the construction of
a tree-based routing topology initiated by a sink [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In particular,
these protocols use advertised information (e.g. hop count from a sink) to build
a routing topology. Secure operation of these protocols is essential for the health
of the network. Consider the attack, known as the sinkhole attack [8], where ma-
licious sensors pretend to be closer to the sinks than all their neighbors. Attract-
ing more traffic, these sensors can either selectively drop the received data (i.e.,
selective-forwarding attack) or collect sensitive information. Clearly, the proto-
cols that construct a routing topology would be significantly affected by these
attacks. More specifically, in Directed Diffusion [1] and TinyOS [7], routes are
established simply based on the reception of beacon messages initiated by the
sink. Hence, sinkholes are easy to create even without any collusion among sen-
sor nodes as there is no mechanism to verify the originator and the contents of the
message. Therefore, fighting against these attacks constitutes the second goal of
this paper.
To meet aforementioned challenges, this paper first studies the impact of selective-
forwarding attacks in tree-based routing topologies. We present a simulation study
where we show the impact of these attacks based on a number of key performance
parameters (e.g., node distribution, density, positioning, and attacker capability)
that influence the impact of these attacks. Our study illustrates the effect of dif-
ferent combinations of these parameters. For instance, a low number of malicious
nodes that are one hop away from the sink can affect the network in the same way
as a high number of randomly distributed malicious nodes. Thus, based on our
simulation study, we propose a single metric named “risk factor”, that can span
these variations.
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Selective-forwarding attacks are usually combined with other attacks. There-
fore, next, we consider the case when the compromised nodes combine selective-
forwarding attacks with sinkhole attacks. In comparison with the current work
[9, 10, 11, 12], this paper focuses on resilience against compromised nodes in-
stead of detection of compromised nodes. We believe resilience is an important
property in WSNs deployed in environments where human intervention is diffi-
cult. Furthermore, detection mechanisms often introduce more complexity, and
so more weaknesses, into the system, which do not always justify their benefits
[9]. To this end, as our second contribution, we propose two RESIlient and Simple
Topology-based reconfiguration protocols: RESIST-1 and RESIST-0. RESIST-1
prevents a malicious node from modifying its advertised distance to the sink by
more than one hop, while RESIST-0 does not allow this at the cost of additional
complexity. Via simulations and using our risk factor metric, we studied the per-
formance of RESIST-1 and RESIST-0 for three tree-based routing protocols, on
a large set of topologies, and with different levels of adversarial power. We also
evaluate the time and energy consumption of security operations of RESIST algo-
rithms to illustrate their feasibility.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are three-fold:
1- We propose a simple but representative metric describing the impact of
selective-forwarding attacks in tree-based routing protocols.
2- We introduce two protocols for building up resilience in wireless sensor
networks. The simulation results show that our protocols are practical and
effective in improving resilience against sinkhole attacks with different lev-
els of adversarial power.
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3- We provide an analysis of the feasibility of the proposed protocols (e.g.,
in terms of time and power consumption). These discussions expose in
greater detail our motivation on the viability of implementing the proposed
protocols in current sensor devices, such as MICAz and TelosB.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present
the system model. In Section 3, we investigate the representation of the impact of
malicious nodes. In Section 4, we lay out our proposal for two simple and resilient
topology-based routing protocols. Performance results are presented in Section 5.
The Section 6 overviews the current literature. Section 7 concludes with future
work. In Appendix, we present further details on cryptographic overhead of the
protocols and discuss optimizations to reduce these costs.
2. Problem statement
We focus on sensor networs, where the main application is environmental
monitoring scenario and physical access to the monitored region is difficult. Our
main goal is to quantify and limit the impact of disruptions caused by compro-
mised/malicious nodes in such networks. (In the rest of the paper, the terms com-
promised and malicious are used interchangeably.) In the following, the network
and threat models are presented in more detail.
2.1. Network model
We consider a connected WSN consisting of S static sensor nodes and one
sink node deployed in a remote area. Each node has a unique ID. Nodes do not
know any location information. Each node ni or the sink is able to communicate
wirelessly with a subset of nodes Nni (its neighbors) that are in its transmission
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range, rt. We assume that for any two nodes X and Y with similar transmission
ranges, if X can communicate with Y , then Y can communicate with X .
We focus on routing protocols that rely on tree-based topology construction [1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], where the data is routed from sensor nodes to the sink through
a tree rooted at the sink. The routing tree is an aggregation of the shortest paths
from each sensor to the sink based on a cost metric, which typically represents any
application requirement (e.g., hop count, loss or delay). In this paper, we assume
the routing tree is built by using the hop distance to the sink and through periodic
routing messages the routing topology is refreshed regularly. It is worth noting
that our RESIST protocols are deployed under the routing protocol, and expects
correct execution of the tree construction and maintenance.
2.2. Trust and threat models
A straightforward implementation of a secure WSN may consider multiple
sinks, each equipped with its own public/private key pair. For simplicity of pre-
sentation, we only consider the case of a single sink. Hence, in our model, all
sensors know and trust the public key, Ksinkpub , of the sink. Additionally, each sen-
sor ni has a pair of public-private keys (Knipub, K
ni
pri) that it uses to prove its identity.
These key pairs can be generated and uploaded offline to the sensors before the
deployment. Using these key pairs, nodes perform authentication and sign data
messages. Finally, in our trust model, sensors never lie about their identities due
to the use of cryptographic methods [13]. In fact, we assume that public-key cryp-
tographic primitives are available on all sensors. In Section 5.4 and Appendix A,
we discuss the overhead, and hence, the feasibility of our assumptions for current
sensor node architectures.
In this paper, we consider two types of threats: selective-forwarding and sink-
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hole attacks. We first focus on selective-forwarding attacks launched by the com-
promised nodes inside the network (Section 3). Compromised nodes are modeled
as nodes that drop messages with probability p instead of forwarding them. When
probability p = 1, compromised nodes drop all the messages (this is usually the
case in sinkhole attacks). When p < 1, compromised nodes can disrupt the net-
work operation, without being easily detected.
Next, we focus on sinkhole attacks launched by the compromised nodes inside
and/or outside the network (Section 4). In this case, the objective of the compro-
mised nodes is to appear attractive to their surrounding nodes in terms of routing.
An example scenario could be that a malicious node claiming to reach the sink in
a single hop. Hence, the compromised node advertises a single high-quality route
to the sink attracting a possibly large volume of traffic. Furthermore, two or more
sensors may collude to increase the impact of their attack on the network (e.g., a
wormhole attack). Solutions to the above attacks have been generally based on
temporal and geographical stamps [14]. We will analyze the impact of collusion
on our security protocols in Section 5.3.
We define a common notation, SA(X, d1, d2), for a sinkhole attack by node
X , advertising a distance d1 instead of its real distance d2. Note that in a pure
selective-forwarding attack, the malicious node might not lie about its distance.
Hence, the attack is SA(X, d(X), d(X)), but packets are dropped with a proba-
bility p.
3. Impact of Malicious Sensors
When assessing the performance of tree-based routing protocols, it is crucial
to characterize the routing topology in terms of its vulnerability to malicious sen-
sors. Typically, “the number of compromised sensors” is used as a metric for
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this purpose [9, 15]. However, this metric is not necessarily a good indicator of
the hazard that malicious nodes might cause in a WSN: one compromised sen-
sor close to the sink can reduce the data delivery success more than dozens of
compromised sensors at the border of the network. Intuitively, when tree-based
routing protocols are in use, the impact of a malicious sensor mostly depends on
the number of uncompromised sensors in its sub-tree. We thus introduce a new
metric, called Risk Factor, which is able to represent the interplay among different
parameters such as the number of compromised sensors, their position, the den-
sity and size of the network. This new metric allows us to evaluate the impact of
selective forwarding and sinkhole attacks on tree-based routing protocols by clas-
sifying different compromised topologies into a few equivalence classes. Next,
we present our metric and show, through simulations (performed using a discrete
event-based simulator implemented in Java), how it captures various parameters
of compromised topologies.
3.1. Risk Factor computation
We compute the “Risk Factor” of a given topology by first computing a local
risk factor for each node X , denoted as LRiskX . Essentially, LRiskX intuitively
shows the probability that a message from a node X arrives at a compromised
sensor on its way to the sink. Then, the risk factor of the whole topology can be
computed as the average of the local risk factors of all nodes in the network.
To compute LRiskX for all nodes, we first consider the network topology
as a graph G(V,E), where V is the set of sensor nodes and the sink, and E is
the set of edges, (i.e. links between nodes that can communicate directly within
transmission range). Any shortest path algorithm, e.g. Dijkstra or Bellman-Ford,
can be run over G(V,E) to compute the distance to the sink for each sensor as the
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minimum hop count to the sink.
The LRiskX of a compromised node X is its probability p of dropping a
message, while, LRisksink of the sink is 0, as we assume that the sink cannot be
compromised. For all other nodes, LRiskX is computed as the average of the local
risk factors of all neighbors that are strictly closer to the sink. More formally:
LRiskX =


0 if X is the sink
p if X is malicious
P
Y ∈NX |dY <dX
LRiskY
|{Y ∈NX |dY <dX}|
otherwise,
(1)
where NX is the neighbor set of X , dX is its distance to the sink, {Y ∈ NX |
dY < dX} is the subset of its neighbors with a shorter distance to the sink, and |S|
is the cardinality of S. While Equation 1 does not explicitly represent the attacker
capability, except for selective forwarding probability p, the effect of different type
of “distance” attacks is captured implicitly through the use of dX . Note that the
“distance attacks”, such as the sinkhole attacks considered in this paper, mainly
affect how a node perceives its distance to the sink and hence, dX . We present
further detail on risk factor computation under different scenarios in Section 5.
LRiskX is computed recursively in a distributed way starting from the sink
until the leaves of the routing tree. Given LRiskX , ∀X ∈ V , the risk factor of the
entire topology, TRisk, is:
TRisk =
∑
X∈V LRiskX
|V |
(2)
The strength of the proposed risk factor lies in its ability to capture the mean
impact of all the possible shortest-path trees that can be created by an arbitrary
routing protocol. Essentially, the local risk factor accounts for all neighbors that
are closer to the sink, and hence, it is able to represent all the potential parents
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(including compromised nodes pretending to be closer to the sink) on any tree-
based routing topology.
3.2. Risk Factor pertinence
In this section, we show how our Risk Factor captures the different character-
istics of a compromised topology. We assume malicious nodes perform selective-
forwarding attacks with p = 1. We evaluate Risk Factor with varying:
• Compromised node distributions, which represents the distribution of com-
promised nodes in the geographic area covered by the network.
• Network scale, which defines the number of sensor nodes and the area the
network covers.
• Number of compromised sensors
3.2.1. Distribution of compromised nodes
The distribution of compromised sensors has an important impact on the extent
of the damage. As a rule of thumb, if the compromised nodes are closer to the
sink, their effect is higher since they are expected to forward more data than nodes
that are farther away. To understand how the Risk Factor takes this into account,
we evaluate four different distributions of compromised sensors (not necessarily
realistic):
• Uniformly Random (UR)
• Linear (L), so that they form an imaginary line that runs through the area
of the network.
• Ring (R), so that they form a ring surrounding the sink.
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Figure 1: Risk Factor of different malicious node distributions.
• Gaussian (G), so that they follow a Gaussian distribution around a center
point according to a dispersion parameter.
Fig. 1 shows that our risk factor indeed captures the impact of these distribu-
tions. All topologies are of fixed size (500 sensors), density (3 ln 500) (as defined
in [16]) and number of compromised nodes (50). All nodes are uniformly dis-
tributed in a simulation area a2 = pirtN
3 lnN
(as in [17]), except the sink which is
always in the center. For each distribution, we plotted the risk factor as the dis-
tance from the sink increases. The distance is the distance of the ring for R, and
is not a factor for UR. For L, it represents the distance from the sink to the closest
(imaginary) point on the line. Finally, for G, it is the distance to the center of the
distribution. Note that the distance is normalized by the maximum distance to the
side of the network area. For G, we use the same normalization for the variance,
and restrict ourselves to 0.1 and 0.5 for Fig. 1.
As expected, the risk factor increases as the distance decreases (except for
UR, where the distance is not a parameter of the distribution). Perhaps less ex-
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pectedly, the risk factor oscillates for the R distribution, which can be explained
as follows: if we represent all the nodes with the same distance to the sink as a
disk, compromised nodes on the border of the disk have a higher chance than the
ones inside to be chosen as parents by the nodes outside the disk. Hence, the risk
factor is maximum when the ring of compromised nodes is exactly at a multiple
of the transmission range (here, the transmission range is equal to 0.21 times the
maximum distance to the sink). Nevertheless, the risk factor for R still globally
decreases as the distance increases.
3.2.2. Scale of the Sensor Network
In this section, we investigate the effect of network scale. Intuitively, networks
with higher number of nodes are expected to experience less danger compared to
sparse networks with the same number of malicious nodes. We evaluate the scale
of a sensor network as (1) the number of sensors and (2) the geographical area
the sensor network covers. Hence, in our simulations, we either kept the area of
the network constant (Area-Constant/AC deployment) and hence, increased the
density by adding more nodes, or increased the area of the network proportionally
to the number of sensors (Density-Constant/DC). Furthermore, for each case, we
first assumed that the number of malicious nodes remained the same (Malicious-
Constant/MC). Next, we also scaled up the adversary capability and kept the un-
compromised to compromised ratio constant (Malicious-Adapting/MA). In our
simulations, in the DC deployment, the network density is 3ln(100), whereas in
the AC scenarios the network spans 95× 95 meters. In MC scenarios, the number
of malicious nodes is 50. Finally, we use two MA configurations with the ratio of
malicious nodes is 10% and 50%.
Fig. 2 depicts the risk factor for these different cases. For Area-Constant and
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Figure 2: Risk Factor as the scale of the network increases
Malicious-Constant (AC/MC), as expected, the risk factor decreases considerably,
as the number of nodes increases and the number of compromised nodes stays
constant. The same argument also applies to Density-Constant and Malicious-
Constant (DC/MC). However, in the case of Malicious-Adapting (MA), the two
different deployments exhibit different behaviors. For AC, the increase in the
number of nodes is neutralized by the increase in compromised nodes. However,
this is not the case for DC. Since the transmission range is fixed, a bigger area
increases the depth of routing trees that connect nodes to the sink. So, as the
number of malicious nodes scales with the number of nodes, each malicious node
has a potentially higher impact based on the depth of the tree. The risk factor
captures this difference between AC/MA and DC/MA, as it remains constant for
the former and increases for the latter.
3.2.3. Number of compromised nodes
Finally, we present how the risk factor captures the effect of the number of
malicious nodes in the network. In Fig. 3, we evaluate the risk factor for differ-
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ent malicious nodes distributions (discussed in Section 3.2.1). All topologies are
networks of 512 sensors with moderate density (3ln(512)) and the transmission
range rt of each sensor is 20 m and the network is 185× 185 m.
Fig. 3 shows that the ring case (i.e., R) can cause major damage to the net-
work with a relatively small number of malicious nodes, however, only at limited
distances from the sink (d). On the other hand, for both UR and G, there is no
limit on the number of malicious nodes. Hence, as the number of malicious nodes
increases, their risk factors become higher than the risk factor of R (d=1). Most
importantly, Fig. 3 shows that risk factor increases fast until 25−40% of the nodes
are compromised and from this point on, the increase is not significant. This is
also what would be expected in a real world scenario. Hence, we believe our risk
factor metric is able to represent the impact of different parameters. Furthermore,
the correctness of our metric is also shown in Section 5, where we show that the
receive success always decreases as the risk factor increases.
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4. Security protocols
In this section, we describe two reconfiguration protocols aimed at fighting
sinkhole attacks on tree-based routing in WSNs.
4.1. Overview and notation
To achieve higher resilience in tree-based routing protocols [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7],
we propose two schemes, which are executed during the routing tree reconfigu-
ration phase triggered by the sink. The proposed schemes are implemented un-
der the routing protocol and can be adapted to any tree–based protocol. We do
not have any constraints on the period between reconfigurations: it is chosen by
the routing protocol and, for optimization reasons, can be tuned based on cost
or topology vulnerability. We define a class of RESIST-h protocols that prevent
malicious nodes from modifying their advertised distance to the sink by more
than h hops. Based on this definition, we introduce two protocols, RESIST-1 and
RESIST-0, which are presented in the remainder of this section. We also describe
here cryptographic operations and message contents of the proposed protocols,
but refer the reader to Appendix A for an efficient way of implementing them.
We use the following notation. IDni symbolizes the unique identification
number of the node ni and Nni represents the set of neighbors of node ni. More-
over, let Knipub, K
ni
pri be the key pair for node ni and {x}K be a signature algorithm
(e.g. any suitable ECC–DSA algorithm) that signs message x under key K.
4.2. Simple reconfiguration protocol (RESIST-1)
The reconfiguration starts by the sink sending a Hello(epoch, tokens) mes-
sage (Fig. 4–m1.1) to all its neighbors (Nsink), where epoch is a strictly increasing
timestamp, chosen by the sink, and tokens is a list of tokens [T1, T2, ..., TR] (note
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Simple reconfiguration protocol (RESIST-1)
1. Sink → ni ∈ Nsink: m1.1 = hello(epoch, [T1,T2, ..., TR])
2.1 ni ∈ N : ni → nj ∈ Nni : m2.1 = hello(epoch, [Td,Td+1, ..., TR])
2.2 nj → nk ∈ Nnj : m2.2 = hello(epoch, [Td+1, ..., TR])
where Tx = 〈x, epoch, {〈x, epoch〉}Ksink
pri
〉
Complex reconfiguration protocol (RESIST-0)
1. Sink → ni ∈ Nsink: m1 = hello(epoch, [T1,T2, ..., TR])
2.1. ni ∈ N : ni → nj ∈ Nni : m2.1 = hello(epoch, [Td,Td+1, ..., TR])
2.2. nj → nk ∈ Nnj : m2.2 = hello(epoch, [Td+1, ..., TR])
3. nk → nj : m3 = Challenge(d, epoch)
4. nj → nk: m4 = ChallengeReply(d, epoch,Kdpub,
{〈d, epoch,Kdpub〉}Ksinkpri , {〈ID
nj , IDnk〉}Kk
pri
)
where
(Kxpub,K
x
pri) is a new key pair for token k
generated by the sink
and Tx = 〈x, epoch,Kxpub, {〈x, epoch,Kxpub〉}Ksinkpri ,K
x
pri〉
Figure 4: RESIST-1 and RESIST-0 schemes.
that this list is created according to the underlying tree-based routing protocol,
i.e. R represents the largest hop distance to the sink). Essentially, each token is a
(token number, epoch) pair signed by the sink:
Tx = 〈x, epoch, {〈x, epoch〉}Ksinkpri
〉 (3)
where x is the token number.
When a sensor nj receives a Hello message (Fig. 4–m2.1), and after verifying
that the tokens are correctly signed by the sink (i.e. by using the public keyKsinkpub ),
it does the following:
2.1 If the epoch is new, it remembers the identity of the node sending it (his par-
ent), and propagates the Hello message after removing the token with the
shortest hop distance from the list of tokens (Fig. 4–m2.2). In other words, it
receives Hello(epoch, [Td, Td+1, ..., TR]) but sends Hello(epoch, [Td+1, ..., TR]).
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Figure 5: RESIST-1 overview. Tokens are removed from the list while the messages are forwarded
up the tree, so that sensors far from the sink have less information than sensors closer to the sink.
2.2 If the epoch is already known, but the Hello message advertises a shorter
hop distance to the sink (i.e., contains a smaller token), a selfish approach
would only update the node itself, while a gossip approach would also prop-
agate a new Hello message to the neighbors. In the rest of the paper, we
follow the gossip approach.
Each sensor remembers as its parent, from which it received the shortest dis-
tance token in the most recent epoch. Alternatively, sensors can also choose to
remember all the nodes that advertise the shortest distance for a given epoch. In
Section 5, we also evaluate this approach. Fig. 5 illustrates an overview of the
RESIST-1 scheme.
4.2.1. Sinkhole attack resilience
A compromised node can directly forward the Hello message without drop-
ping the first token. Assume that the node is the first compromised node on the
branch where the Hello message travels. Then, if the compromised node is at
distance d from the sink, its neighbors would believe they are at distance d too,
and so, they would believe that the compromised node is at distance d − 1. Nev-
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ertheless, the compromised node cannot pretend to be at a distance smaller than
d− 1, because it would be unable to provide smaller tokens than Td. Note that as
the Hello message travels up the tree, it might encounter other malicious nodes
that do not drop the token before forwarding the message. In this case, each cor-
rect sensor would believe that it is at a shorter distance from the sink depending
on how many malicious nodes exist before it (e.g., if the number of malicious
nodes between the sensor and the sink is 2, then it will at most believe it is 2 hops
closer to the sink than the reality). Hence, the deviation from the real distance in
RESIST-1 increases with the number of malicious nodes on the path. However,
the main impact is still received from the node closes to the sink, and other com-
promised nodes are to expected to have diminishing effects as the distance to the
sink increases.
A compromised node may also make nodes think they are farther away from
the sink that in reality, by removing more than one token from the list of tokens.
Nevertheless, our focus is on selective forwarding combined with sinkhole attacks,
and so, the increase of the distance to the sink will not help compromised nodes
attract traffic. Additionally, the gossip approach can limit the impact of this attack,
since Hello messages advertising the shortest distance to the sink may be received
from other neighbors.
4.3. Complex reconfiguration protocol (RESIST-0)
The protocol RESIST-0 is inspired by a protocol used to measure availability
in peer-to-peer networks [18], where newly generated pairs of cryptographic keys
are diffused in the network at every round.
The sink sends a Hello(epoch, [T1, ..., TR]) message (Fig. 4–m1), where the
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generated tokens are:
Tx = 〈x, epoch,K
x
pub, {〈x, epoch,K
x
pub〉}Ksinkpri
,Kxpri〉, (4)
where (Kxpub, Kxpri) is a newly generated pair of cryptographic keys for token
Tx at a given epoch. The protocol is similar to RESIST-1, except that, before
choosing a sensor Y as its parent, a sensor X first challenges Y by sending a
Challenge(d, epoch) message (Fig. 4–m3). Basically, this message asks Y to
prove its distance d from the sink (i.e. that it has a copy of the token Td). Sensor
Y replies with a message ChallengeReply (Fig. 4–m4), which contains:
〈d, epoch,Kdpub, {〈d, epoch,K
d
pub〉}Ksinkpri , {〈ID
Y , IDX〉}Kdpri〉
The first part is the first half of the token Td that Y received. At the reception
of the ChallengeReply message and using the public key Ksinkpub , node X can
first verify if the token Td was correctly signed by the sink. In addition, node
X recovers the public key of the token Td, Kdpub. Then, it can verify the second
part of the ChallengeReply message, i.e. the identities of X and Y , that were
signed with the private key of token Td, Kdpri. If verified, it accepts Y ’s advertised
distance d from the sink. For the sake of illustration, Fig. 6 depicts a sequence
chart for RESIST-0 scheme. It is worth noting that, these sets of operations prevent
a node, which is a neighbor of bothX and Y and that got the Hello message, from
answering the Challenge message.
4.3.1. Sinkhole attack resilience
It is impossible for a compromised sensor (without collusion) to correctly re-
ply to a Challenge, since it needs to know the privvate key for the token Td to
sign the second part of the ChallengeReply message. Furthermore, compro-
mised nodes cannot even carry out the attack that we described for RESIST-1.
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Figure 6: RESIST-0 overview. RESIST-0 improves on RESIST-1 by checking the advertised
distance of each sensor.
Essentially, not dropping the token would fail, because they would not be able to
respond to the Challenge for the shortest hop count. Hence, RESIST-0 provides
strong resilience against sinkhole attacks. We discuss the impact of collusion on
our protocols in Section 5.
5. Performance Evaluation
The main focus of our evaluation is to understand the amount of resilience ob-
tained by RESIST protocols described in Section 4. We also consider the overhead
of RESIST protocols in terms of the time and energy it takes to perform crypto-
graphic operations. Additional implementation requirements and a discussion on
the feasibility of the RESIST protocols are presented in the Appendix.
In the following, we first evaluate the effect of three different routing schemes
and multi-path routing. Next, we present performance results under different sce-
narios with both non-colluding and colluding malicious nodes. We finally con-
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clude with analytical results on energy and time overhead.
The experiments were run in a discrete event-based simulator implemented
in Java. As we are only interested in a RESIST’s algorithmic evaluation and on
its resilience to message losses due to selective-forwarding and sinkhole attacks,
our simulator uses a simplified MAC layer, where wireless message losses are
not considered. These losses may only lead to some nodes not learning the real
shortest paths to the sink, and does not affect the correctness of RESIST protocols.
5.1. Simulation Setup
This section describes three baseline protocols and our simulation setup. We
consider a data collection application, where each sensor periodically sends data
(e.g., measurements) to the sink. The routing tree is regularly reconfigured (e.g.,
according to the specification of the [7]). Malicious nodes do not generate data
and they drop every received message with probability p = 1.
We implemented three baseline routing protocols: FTree, RRobin and RWalk.
We studied the performance of these protocols in networks when resilient recon-
figuration schemes are used (RESIST-1 and RESIST-0) and not used (vulnerable
case). In our simulations, compromised nodes try to attract higher volumes of
traffic by advertising shorter paths.
In FTree, the routing tree is rebuilt at each reconfiguration phase. Every sen-
sor forwards all its data to its parent until the next reconfiguration. RRobin differs
from FTree as each sensor computes a set of alternative parents during the recon-
figuration phase. This set includes the neighbor that sent the first Hello message
and any neighbor that sent a Hello message with a hop count smaller or equal to
the first neighbor. Each time a sensor has to send a message, it selects one parent
from this set in a round robin way. In RWalk protocol, each sensor makes a ran-
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dom decision about forwarding a message either over the routing tree (computed
as in FTree) or forwarding it to a randomly selected neighbor. If the message is
not sent over the tree, it follows a n-hop random walk and after n hops, it is again
forwarded over the routing tree. The goal of both RRobin and RWalk protocols
is to avoid regions that may be severely affected by malicious nodes. In all our
experiments with RWalk, we use n = 1.
We generated many random topologies. The space of topologies was divided
in 10 buckets, where buckets 0, 1, etc. contain the topologies whose risk fac-
tor is respectively in [0,0.1), [0.1, 0.2), etc. At each step, the risk factor for the
topology was evaluated and then, the topology added to the corresponding bucket,
until every bucket had at least 100 topologies. Using these topologies, the per-
formance gain was computed as the ratio of messages that actually reach the sink
compared to the number of messages that should reach the sink if no sensor were
compromised.
5.2. Evaluation of RESIST protocols with non-colluding attacks
In this section, we evaluate each routing protocol separately. Our results show
that RESIST-0 achieves significant performance gain for all routing protocols (see
Fig. 7). RESIST-1 improves performance compared to the vulnerable case, but the
gain is much smaller than with RESIST-0. In general, as the risk factor increases,
the performance of routing protocols decreases. More importantly, for both vul-
nerable and RESIST-1 cases, this decrease is roughly exponential, whereas for
RESIST-0, it has a better, linear decrease, as it does not allow nodes to lie about
their distance to the sink.
Fig. 7 confirms that when malicious sensors are able to lie, they can attract
more network traffic and thus, incur a much higher impact in the WSN. The linear
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Figure 7: Performance gain for different routing protocols: (a) FTree, (b) RRobin (c) RWalk (n =
1)
decrease achieved by RESIST-0 is the upper bound of the performance we can
obtain by only addressing the sinkhole attacks.
5.2.1. Effects of using multi-path routing
To get better results, one must also fight selective forwarding attacks. An at-
tractive approach to decrease the impact of selective-forwarding attacks is to send
each message through multiple paths to the sink. Fig. 8 shows the improvement
gained by using two paths per message (one FTree path and another RRobin path).
In this case, an improvement of 5%-10% is observed. These results confirm the
superiority of RESIST-0 in resisting sinkhole attacks compared to RESIST-1 and
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multi-path routing.
5.2.2. Effects of using different tree-based routing protocols
In this section, we compare the three routing protocols for resilient (i.e., RESIST-
0 and RESIST-1) and vulnerable cases. To make such a comparison, we also mod-
ified the computation of the risk factor to represent the attacker capability more
accurately. The main goal of this study is to understand which routing protocol is
more advantageous among the three.
Performance in RESIST-0 Case. The performance results with RESIST-0 are de-
picted in Fig. 9(a). Note that even if sinkhole attacks are avoided, malicious nodes
can still perform the selective forwarding attack. Fig. 9(a) clearly shows that
FTree and RRobin outperform RWalk. This is expected as in RWalk, the average
path length that each message travels to the sink is longer. This consequently
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Figure 9: RESIST-0 performance evaluation: (a) Comparative performance of routing protocols.
(b) Number of severely affected zones in the network (threshold =60%). (c) Received ratio of
affected zones in the network.
increases the probability of meeting a malicious node on the path. Further ex-
perimentation on RWalk also showed that the protocol performance is inversely
proportional to n. This actually means that the best case for n-hop random walk
is achieved when n = 0, in which case RWalk is equivalent to FTree routing.
Fig. 9(a) also shows that FTree and RRobin have similar performance. This
is surprising since, intuitively, the performance of RRobin should be better com-
pared to FTree. Analyzing the results, we observe that, as expected, for sensors,
which have malicious parents, RRobin improves the performance by letting these
nodes periodically send to alternative parents. However, this does not necessarily
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improve overall performance as the reverse case also holds: sensor nodes with
good parents switch to using malicious nodes as parents in a round robin fashion.
Consequently, any gain from RRobin is neutralized by putting sensor nodes with
good parents at risk.
To better understand the effect of malicious nodes on the protocol behavior,
we divide the network into 100 equal zones and define the failure threshold of a
zone as the percentage of data missing from the zone to qualify the zone as poorly
monitored. In reality, this threshold would depend on the criticality of the sensor
network application. We set the failure threshold as 60% in our experiments.
Fig. 9(b) illustrates how many zones fell above the failure threshold for each risk
factor bucket and routing protocol. Initially, the number of zones above the failure
threshold is higher for FTree than RRobin. Noticing that both protocols share the
same receive ratio (see Fig. 9(c)), this means that RRobin just diffuses the effect of
malicious nodes to more zones, so that fewer zones actually fail. However, as the
risk factor increases, the number of zones above threshold increases beyond FTree
due to the reverse case appearing more often. Increasing the failure threshold
moves the shift point to the right. Nevertheless, although the number of affected
zones is higher for RRobin, the average received data ratio per affected zone still
remains higher than FTree. On the other hand, the number of affected zones in
RWalk is always the highest due to its overall poor performance.
Performance in RESIST-1 and vulnerable cases. To better understand the perfor-
mance of RESIST-1 and vulnerable cases, we slightly modified the computation
of the risk factor presented in Section 3. The main reason for this modification is
to represent the different adversarial power of compromised nodes in RESIST-1
and vulnerable cases. Note that the only difference between these two cases is
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Figure 10: Comparative performance of routing protocols without any RESIST protocols (using
Vulnerable Risk Factor).
the advertised distance to the sink, and hence, the only change in the computa-
tion is the way initial distances are calculated for each sensor. In the RESIST-1
case, since a malicious node can lie by one hop, its distance is equal to that of its
neighbor with the smallest distance to the sink. For the vulnerable case, malicious
nodes can pretend to be the sink, and so, the distance of each malicious node is
0. Hence, the shortest path algorithm needs to be run once for each sink, real and
pretend. At the end, each node is assigned the shortest distance to one of the sinks.
Hereafter, each version of the risk factor is referred as RESIST-1 Risk Factor and
Vulnerable Risk Factor, respectively.
Figs. 10 and 11 show the performance of FTree, RRobin and RWalk (n =
1) under the vulnerable and RESIST-1 cases, respectively. For each graph, we
partitioned topologies based on their respective risk factors (i.e., RESIST-1 and
Vulnerable Risk Factor). Quite different than the RESIST-0 results (see Fig. 9(a)),
RRobin performs the best for the vulnerable case (see Fig. 10). This is because,
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Figure 11: Comparative performance of routing protocols under the RESIST-1 protocol (using
RESIST-1 Risk Factor).
in this case, the FTree algorithm outputs a forest of small routing trees, where the
real sink and each malicious node is the root of one of these trees. Obviously, only
the nodes that belong to the tree of the real sink can deliver data. In contrast, since
RRobin allows nodes to follow different routes to the sink, it is able to reduce the
effect of these sinkhole attacks. Note that the reverse case of RRobin (i.e., nodes
with good parents using malicious nodes as alternative parents) does still exist.
However, in the vulnerable case, the effect of fragmenting the network into several
trees with FTree is greater than the reverse case of RRobin. Such fragmentation
also occurs in RWalk, which explains why its performance is lower than RRobin
as well. Note that, in RWalk, the routing tree is built in the same way as in FTree.
Interestingly, RRobin cannot sustain the same performance in the RESIST-
1 case. In the vulnerable case, the performance of FTree and RWalk is highly
affected by the fragmentation of the network into disconnected trees. Hence,
RRobin is able to perform better. However, note that, in RRobin, if a node re-
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ceives the first Hello message from a malicious node, then other neighbors may
not be able to join the set of alternative parents, if they advertise longer distances.
Hence, the set of alternative parents becomes very small and most often, con-
sists of one malicious parent (or one of its descendants). This problem, although
it appears in the vulnerable case too, is more obviously seen in RESIST-1 case,
since FTree and RWalk can perform better in this case. Hence, in the RESIST-1
case, all protocols perform comparably, with FTree performing slightly better (see
Fig. 11).
5.3. Evaluation of RESIST protocols with colluding attacks
To be able to implement sinkhole attacks in the presence of RESIST protocols,
malicious sensors have to be designed to collaborate and share good tokens (i.e., a
token that can prove a short distance to the sink). More specifically, two malicious
nodes need to collude through a private communication channel in order to send
tokens to each other. Consider the example of the sensor network in Fig. 12.
Node C1, which is close to the sink, helps node C2, which is at the border of
the network. Thanks to C1, C2 can attract traffic from nodes Z and possibly Y.
However, since C1 is already very close to the sink, it would have captured these
messages anyway: so, collusion in this case does not increase the power of an
attack much.
Collusion is also limited by the communication capabilities of malicious sen-
sors: in Fig. 13, we simulated the impact of collusion when colluding sensors
have normal-range radios and are distributed randomly on the network area. In
our simulations, malicious nodes exchange tokens so that they all appear at the
same distance from the sink (i.e., the distance of the malicious node that is closest
to the sink). We only plot RESIST-0 performance with collusion as this is the
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Figure 12: A compromised sensor C1 close to the sink helps another sensor C2 to launch a sinkhole
attack. However, C1 has already enough power of disruption, and hence, C2 the increase the power
of the attack marginally.
more interesting case. In RESIST-0, the sharing of tokens enables replying chal-
lenges for shorter distances and hence, has an effect on performance (see Curves
I and II when compared to Curve VI in Fig. 13). Fig. 13–Curve V also shows the
default malicious behavior scenario (i.e., without colluders) for RESIST-1 for ref-
erence. Note that in the case of RESIST-1, a malicious node close to the sink (e.g.
at level k) will manage to attach a very large subtree by just lying by one hop (e.g.,
all the nodes within his neighborhood at level k+1). Although these neighbors do
not explicitly collude, the pure existence of them allows non-malicious nodes to
think they are closer to the sink: the more there are malicious nodes on the path,
the closer the nodes think they are to the sink, hence, significantly affecting the
way the tree is built.
The most powerful attack would be a malicious sensor, which is close to the
sink and has a long-range radio, propagating tokens to malicious sensors far from
the sink (see Fig. 13–Curves III-IV). For example, the Curve III in Fig. 13 assumes
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that malicious nodes shares tokens with all the malicious nodes in the network, but
do not lie about their positions. Again, this case might not cause a significantly
higher degradation in performance, as the dominant impact already comes from
the malicious node closest to the sink. In fact, RESIST-0 achieves far better per-
formance than the vulnerable case, even in the worst case, where malicious nodes
have long-range radios and collude (see Curve IV when compared to Curve VI in
Fig. 13 ). For the scenario shown in Fig. 13 Curve IV, a malicious node at level k
will not be able to attract uncompromised nodes at level k + 1, as it is impossible
to lie to them. However, by passing the token to a colluder farther away, a mali-
cious node enables its colluder to respond to challenges. Nevertheless, note that
the lie about hop count starts diffusing from the point the malicious node reaches
to another malicious node, while with RESIST-1 lies can diffuse much earlier,
from the point the first malicious node at k lies.
In summary, if a node C1 helps a node C2, with d(C1) < d(C2), to perform a
sinkhole attack:
• With RESIST-1, two sinkhole attacks are performed: SA(C1, d(C1)−1, d(C1))
and SA(C2, d(C1)− 1, d(C2))
• With RESIST-0, one sinkhole attack is performed SA(C2, d(C1), d(C2))
while the second attack is a pure selective-forwarding one SA(C1, d(C1), d(C1))
In both cases, the attack by C1, which is closer to the sink, would probably be
more efficient than the one by C2 and hence, the benefits from collusion would
not justify the cost of implementing it.
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Static Message Dynamic Reconfiguration Costper Sensor
RESIST-1 64B 45B ×R 2KB V
RESIST-0 64B 85B ×R 2KB 3× V + S
Figure 14: A summary of memory consumption, signature operations, and computational/com-
munication complexity for relaying sensors. Note that sink operations are managed by the base
station. Legend: S: Signature generation; V: Signature verification; H: Hash computation; R:
Distance hops from the sink; k: Current distance to the sink; EC: ECC point multiplication cost.
MICAz TelosB
St(Sp) 0.89 s (26.96 mWs) 0.52 s (6.26 mWs)
Vt(Vp) 1.77 s (53.42 mWs) 1.02 s (12.41 mWs)
Ht(Hp) 3636 µs (5.9 µWs/byte) 7272 µs ( 5.9 µWs/byte)
ECt(ECp) 1.24 s (26.10 mWs) 1.44 s (6.00 mWs)
Figure 15: Current benchmarks of time and energy (in brackets) estimations for ECDSA–160
signature generation S, verification V , SHA–1 computation H and EC–160 point multiplication
operations.
5.4. Analysis of Time and Power Consumption in RESIST
In this section, we briefly discuss the feasibility of implementing the RESIST
protocols in WSN platforms. We focus mainly on the time and power needed to
perform cryptographic operations. To estimate the time and power, we used the
results presented in [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. For the sake of clarity, Fig. 14–
column 4 gathers the cost of specific cryptographic operations for each RESIST
version. In our analysis, we assume ECDSA–160 signature generation S, veri-
fication V , SHA–1 computation H and EC–160 point multiplication operations.
The reasons for these choices are detailed in the Appendix, where we also present
additional optimizations to RESIST algorithms to further reduce their costs.
Using power consumption estimations on a MICAz and the more powerful
TelosB in [20, 21, 23], we lay out some interesting results regarding the crypto-
graphic operations (see Fig. 15). In particular, ECDSA–160 takes only 0.52 s
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(6.26 mWs) and 1.02 s (12.41 mWs) on a TelosB, for the signature generation
and the verification operations respectively [24]. Moreover, on MICAz, the same
operations consume 0.89 s (26.96 mWs) and 1.77 s (53.42 mWs) respectively.
For EC point multiplication time and energy consumption, we used the results
from [20]. It takes, on average, 1.24 seconds for a MicaZ sensor mote to compute
a fixed point multiplication and 1.44s on TelosB. The power consumed by the
sensor nodes to perform ECC-160 is around 26.10mWs on MICAz and around
6.00mWs on TelosB [22]. Furthermore, according to the analysis and further
comparison of data sheets for TelosB and MicaZ [20], we approximated the en-
ergy consumption of the computation of an SHA-1 hash value to be 5.9µWs/byte.
In addition, SHA-1 computation takes 3636µs/byte on a MICAz sensor mote, and
an estimated time of 7272µs/byte on TelosB mote. Given the resilience achieved
against sinkhole and selective forwarding attacks, we believe it is cost-effective to
implement RESIST protocols in WSNs.
6. Related work
Security in wireless networks is attracting the attention of many researchers
since it is vital to guarantee correct operation of sensor protocols. This paper
focuses particularly on sink-hole and selective forwarding attacks. Most other
approaches against these attacks revolves around detection of malicious nodes
[12, 11, 15, 25]. For instance, in secure AODV (SAODV) [25], the route discov-
ery mechanism of the AODV routing protocol is protected by signing messages.
More specifically, a key management scheme is used where each node is assigned
to an asymmetric signature key pair and non-mutable fields of the messages are
signed with such digital signatures of nodes. Authentication can be then per-
formed in a point-to-point manner: Any neighbor receiving a routing message
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can securely verify the association between the address of a given ad hoc node
and the public key of that node and detect if a node is behaving maliciously. In
[12], multi-hop acknowledgments are used to detect and blacklist nodes that per-
form selective forwarding attacks. However, in addition to its cost, the proposed
scheme requires geographical location information and strict synchronization. In
[10, 11], a learning technique based on neural networks is used to predict the sen-
sor measurements, and a reputation scheme is used to mark nodes as faulty if their
reports are too different from predictions. In [15], a protocol similar to RESIST-
1 is proposed, but without strong cryptography. As a consequence, it requires a
protocol to detect malicious sensors (reports are vulnerable to falsification) and to
blacklist nodes (through a complex messaging mechanism).
Most practical approaches for establishing secure channels among sensor in
the literature are based on symmetric cryptography, where pairwise keys between
every two neighbor nodes are established after network deployment [26, 27, 28].
Such approaches provide data authenticity and/or confidentiality in a hop-by-
hop manner. However, they rely on uniform wireless communication patterns
in WSNs and consequently, are vulnerable to attacks when this assumption does
not hold.
The LEDS approach [29] (i.e., Location-aware End-to-end Data Security) was
proposed to deal with such constrains on communication patterns. It uses sym-
metric secret keys for secure and reliable data delivery and integrates two build-
ing blocks: a location-aware key management framework and an end-to-end data
security mechanism. The first block considers the construction of a virtual ge-
ographic grid and the binding of each node’s location (i.e., cell in the grid) into
symmetric secret keys owned by that node. The second block guarantees that ev-
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ery report in LEDS is endorsed by multiple sensor nodes and is encrypted with a
unique secret key shared between the event sensing nodes and the sink. Although
a very interesting and robust approach, LEDS requires the deployment of a grid-
based localization scheme as well as assumes densely deployed networks, where
every event of interest can be detected by multiple sensor nodes.
Similar to LEDS, a few other approaches have been proposed to design key
management schemes based on collaborative endorsement: reports that are not
properly endorsed are filtered out by intermediate nodes en-route to the sink or
by the sink itself [30, 31]. Such schemes are complementary to our proposed RE-
SIST schemes. RESIST increases resilience during routing topology construction
(i.e., before data transmission takes place) and can be combined with endorsement
schemes to improve resilience during data communication.
An interesting analysis of DDoS attacks in sensor networks, which also takes
into account different network parameters and some counter measures, is pre-
sented in [32]. While their work covers TCP JellyFish and selective-forwarding
attacks, we focus on sinkhole attacks. Moreover, our study with the Risk Fac-
tor metric captures more network characteristics. An intuitive approach against
selective forwarding attacks is to use multipath routing [8, 33]. However, such
a protocol dramatically increases communication overhead as the redundancy of
paths increases. In addition, these paths eventually converge to a few nodes sur-
rounding the base station where malicious nodes can have a high impact. Indeed,
our simulation results show that the efficiency of this approach is limited, as con-
firmed by [32].
Trust-based systems [34, 35, 36] are interesting approaches to deal with se-
lective forwarding attacks. In these systems, interactions between sensors are
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used for trust level computation. Such systems are, however, often complex. We
believe resilience, as provided by our protocols, is a better choice. As in [37],
RESIST can also use trust levels to choose the set of alternate parents in RRobin
routing.
In this paper, we did not focus on counter-measures against wormhole attacks
as in [38, 39]. In wormhole attacks, a compromised node records control and
data traffic at one location and tunnels it to a colluding nodes, which replays it
locally in another part of the network in a timely manner. Wormhole attacks may
increase the severity of a sinkhole attack [40] as these attacks can prevent nodes
from discovering routes that are more than two hops away. A number of routing
protocols have been proposed to protect the network traffic against such attacks.
In [38], authors introduce the LITEWORP solution, particularly designed for the
detection of the wormhole and the isolation of the compromised nodes. Other
proposals make use of cryptographic techniques and applies trust-based schemes
[40], neighbor list reconstruction procedures [41], special hardware like a direc-
tional antenna and precisely synchronized clocks [42], and also distance bounding
protocols (commonly used in RFID systems) [43].
Finally, the use of Public Key Infrastructures in WSNs, and exhaustive com-
parisons between Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) and RSA on 8-Bit CPUs
have been subject of extensive research [19, 21, 44, 45]. Recently, [45] showed
that ECC can be implemented at a very low cost in WSN and RFID networks
[46]. ECC keys are known to be much smaller than equivalent RSA keys [47], so
that signatures and keys shorter than 110 bits would be largely sufficient in most
contexts.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed two protocols that increase the resilience of the
network in the presence of sink-hole attacks: RESIST-1 prevents malicious nodes
from lying about their advertised distance to the sink more than one hop; and
RESIST-0, which although is more costly, completely stops malicious nodes from
lying about their distance. Our performance evaluation confirmed the higher re-
silience of our protocols, even in the presence of some collusion. Moreover, we
introduced a new metric, the Risk Factor, to measure the impact of selective for-
warding and sinkhole attacks on sensor networks. We showed that it successfully
captures different topology-based parameters, such as the position and number
of malicious nodes, the network scale, and attacker capability. The initial study
of the overhead of the cryptographic operations of RESIST protocols shows the
feasibility of implementing these protocols in WSN platforms. As future work,
we plan to perform an experimental evaluation of our schemes using TinyECC
Library.
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A. Implementation Requirements of RESIST Protocols
In this section, we provide an estimation of the cost of using cryptographic
primitives in sensors networks, as these primitives are the main barrier to the im-
plementation of RESIST protocols. In particular, we evaluate code size, compu-
tational cost, and communication overhead of our security protocols.
A.1. Encryption Parameters
Hardware limitations of sensors determine the feasibility of security solutions.
Hence, there has been extensive research on investigating the usability of crypto-
graphic algorithms in wireless sensor networks. These efforts provide tests per-
formed on dedicated platforms in order to establish a ranking of candidates and
benchmarking for common cryptosystems according to the energy-efficiency and
small-storage requirements of sensors [48, 22, 49, 21]. These performance evalu-
ations typically use the energy models of [22]:
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• Mote2: 16-bit microcontroller with a clock frequency of 12 MHz, a Flash
of 512 KB, and a RAM of 64 KB
• MICAz: based on the low-power 8-bit microcontroller ATMEGA128L run-
ning at 7.37 MHz with 128KB Flash + 4KB RAM
• TelosB: 16-bit MSP430 microcontroller which runs only at 4 MHz and of-
fers 1 MB + 10 KB of memory
Taking into account the resource constraints of such hardware, first, we eval-
uate the memory requirements of our protocols. Our calculations presented in the
rest of the section show that the code, parameters and variables used by crypto-
graphic algorithms should fit the small memory of sensors. Fig. 16 depicts the
main features (memory requirements for code, length of keys and outputs) for
some well-known cryptographic algorithms [49, 21]. We include most of the
common public key cryptosystems (PKC) like RSA, Elliptic Curve (EC) and Ntru
for asymmetric operations like signatures; several symmetric algorithms such as
some well–known stream ciphers (RC4, Snowv2 and Phelix) and block ciphers
(the standard AES, RC5 and Skipjack), and hash functions.
RSA (1024 bits–key) signatures occupy 1024 bits, while the same operation
using EC (ECDSA) with 160 bits–key only generates a block of 320 bits. For
this reason, we will assume that ECDSA is used in RESIST protocols. Conse-
quently, we need 20KB of static memory for the code of cryptographic primitives.
However, we do not discard the option of using other encryption schemes with dif-
ferent overheads that might provide increasing levels of protection vs. efficiency
[50, 51]. For example, the cost of symmetric encryption is negligible compared
to elliptic curve operations.
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Type (/rounds) FLASH (bytes) Key(/IV) (bits) Block (bits)
RSA-1024 PKC 15832 1024 1024 bits-signature
ECDSA-160 PKC 18800 160 320 bits-signature
NTruSign PKC 2214 1169 bits-signature
AES Block/10 4354 128 128
RC5 Block/18 1110 128 64
Skipjack Block/32 856(CTR) 80 64
RC4 Stream 6064 128/0 8
Snow-v2 Stream 11152 128/128 32
Phelix Stream 9968 256/128 32
SHA1 1–Way Hash 30000 <264 160 bit–digest
Figure 16: Code and encryption parameters for several cryptographic algorithms from the litera-
ture, especially from [49, 21]
To generate the epoch values, the RESIST protocols rely on a continuous
counter at the base station. This can be implemented using a lightweight pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG) using just logical operations. For instance,
TinyRNG approach presented in [52] only uses 10KB of static memory consump-
tion and 416 bytes of RAM on a MICAz. Moreover, this method eliminates the
need for tight network-wide synchronization, which is typically hard to achieve.
A.2. Estimation of Messages Sizes
The main cost of our RESIST protocols is the size of Hello messages, which
carry multiple tokens that contain cryptographic values. This cost can be signif-
icantly decreased by an efficient way of encoding tokens. For instance, in [15],
one-way hash functions are used so that token Tk+1 can be computed from token
Tk by applying a hash-function. The construction of the hash chain (HC) is per-
formed by the base station, who first chooses T1 and then computes the last token
at length R, as follows: HR(T1) = H(H(H(. . .H(T1) . . .))) (R times).
Using this method in RESIST-1, Hello messages need only to contain the first
token (i.e., Hk(T1)) and the last token (i.e., HR(T1)), signed by the sink , whereas
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the ”basic” approach would send all the tokens:
Basic RESIST-1:
Sink → ni ⊂ Nsink : Hello(epoch, [Tk, Tk+1, ..., TR])
Optimized RESIST-1:
Sink → ni ⊂ Nsink : Hello(H
k(T1), epoch,H
R(T1), {epoch,H
R(T1)}Ksink
pri
)
On receiving this message, a sensor can compute its hop-count distance k by
hashing R − k times the token Hk(T1) until it reaches HR(T1). Moreover, as it
does not know T1, and H(·) is a one-way function, it cannot compute Hk−1(T1)
and thus, it is not able to lie more than one hop (i.e., as in RESIST-1).
Reconfiguration in RESIST-0 implies additional concerns since the sink gen-
erates and transmits new key pairs for each token. Nevertheless, we can apply
again the idea of hash chains for reducing the cost of cryptography in RESIST-0:
Hello messages need only to propagate the first (i.e., Hk(T1)) and the last token
(i.e., HR(T1)), signed by the sink, but these tokens should now be interpreted as
public keys. Hence, the basic and optimized RESIST-0 can be formulated as:
Basic RESIST-0:
Sink → ni ⊂ Nsink : Hello(epoch, [Tk, Tk+1, ..., TR])
Optimized RESIST-0:
Sink → ni ⊂ Nsink : Hello(K
k
pub, epoch,K
R
pub, {epoch,K
R
pub}Ksinkpri )
Thus, Hello messages just contain the public key generated at level k − 1.
Nodes at level k can use that public key Kkpub to verify replies to challenges based
on Kkpri sent by level k − 1. They also use it to generate the next hop private
key (implemented using ECC) Kk+1pri (with the cost of a modulo operation), from
which the public key Kk+1pub is then generated (with the cost of an exponentiation
operation). That later public key is sent to level k + 1 to be used to verify replies
sent by level k with the generated private key. Note that the private key at level k is
not computed by level k− 1, but, since nodes are supposed to verify the complete
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chain, they should compute all the key–pairs for all higher levels until R (and
then discard them). Though we do not present the cost of the above mentioned
key generation, note that ECC key generation only involves generating a random
number, which becomes the user’s private key, and executing an ECDH operation
to compute the corresponding public key. On the contrary, RSA key generation is
much more time consuming as it requires the generation of large prime numbers.
For details, we refer the reader to [20].
On the other hand and as previously mentioned, signature overhead can be al-
leviated using symmetric algorithms (e.g., as the standard AES, Skipjack or RC4).
For instance, Skipjack has been demonstrated to be a powerful candidate of block
ciphers suitable for WSNs [50]. The periodic key disclosure can be efficiently
tackled using the approach presented in [53]. The use of these schemes, however,
would require significant changes in RESIST and we do not further elaborate on
this optimization in this paper.
In summary, we have identified here two optimizations concerning the length
of Hello messages, and we will discuss their transmission and computation cost,
in terms of time and delay, further, in the following sections. We refer to the new
approaches in the following as:
1. Basic RESIST-1: Hello messages are lists of simple tokens.
2. Optimized RESIST-1: Using the idea of hash chains, all Hello messages
contain the first and the last token, signed by the sink.
3. Basic RESIST-0: Hello messages are lists of tokens containing public–
private keys.
4. Optimized RESIST-0: As Optimized RESIST-1, Hello messages are im-
plemented by hash chains, where the hash function is a two-step function
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generating both the private and the public key.
A.3. Estimation of Memory Usage
Regarding storage, RESIST protocols do not have special memory constraints.
For the four previously described versions of RESIST, we first overview the com-
mon attributes that sensors must statically keep in memory:
• Public key of the sink, Ksinkpub using ECDSA-160 algorithm: 160-bit key (20
bytes).
• Sensor public and private keys: (Knipub, K
ni
pri) (40 bytes). We assume that the
keys of the sink are known by the base station, so that instead of the sink,
the base station can do the most expensive computations, such as generating
new keys or signing data.
• Sensor identifier, IDni: at least 4 bytes. Sensors identifiers should be linked
with their public key, so that malicious nodes cannot easily forge new iden-
tities. For example, the identifier could be a hash of the sensor public key,
or a long subpart of it.
In this way, the total static memory needed for our protocols occupies only 176
bits (i.e. 64B in Fig. 17), along to 20KB for ECDSA algorithm code (crypto-
graphic algorithm and variables) and the 4KB OS code space.
On the other hand, the dynamic memory consumption of each version of the
RESIST protocol depends on the specification and the cryptographic operations
executed. In particular, we study the size of the list of tokens at relaying nodes
(see Fig.17 for a summary), as follows:
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Static Message Dynamic Reconfiguration Costper Sensor
Basic
RESIST-1
64B 45B ×R 2KB V
Optimized
RESIST-1
64B 84B 3KB V + (R − k) ×H
Basic
RESIST-0
64B 85B ×R 2KB 3× V + S
Optimized
RESIST-0
64B 84B 2KB (R − k + 1) × S + 2× V
Figure 17: A summary of memory consumption, signature operations, and computational/com-
munication complexity for relaying sensors. Note that sink operations are managed by the base
station. Legend: S: Signature generation; V: Signature verification; H: Hash computation; R:
Distance hops from the sink; k: Current distance to the sink; EC: ECC point multiplication cost.
• Basic RESIST-1, where Tk = 〈k, epoch, {〈k, epoch〉}Ksinkpri 〉. The token
numbers k are encoded with 1 byte and the strictly increasing timestamp
epoch with 32 bits, resulting in 40 bits in memory for 〈k, epoch〉. 〈k, epoch〉
is signed by the sink using a 320 bits-signature, resulting in 360 bits in
memory for each token. The system also requires 2KB of free space for
signature verification.
Note that a simple rearrangement of signatures leads to only one signature
verification per message, instead of R verifications if all tokens had to be
verified. It is obtained by signing each sub-list of tokens instead of the
tokens themselves:Xk = 〈k, epoch,Xk+1, {k, epoch,Xk+1}Ksinkpri 〉.
• Optimized RESIST-1 is up to 84B for both hash digests (i.e. Hk(T1) and
HR(T1)) and a signature, and 3KB of free space for hash operations.
• Basic RESIST-0, with Tk = 〈k, epoch,Kkpub, {〈k, epoch,Kkpub〉}Ksinkpri , K
k
pri〉,
increases the weight of token lists, by including a new pair of public/pri-
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Number of Packets at Hello (at worst)
Payload(bytes)
Hop–distance 30 45 56 80 94
Basic RESIST-1 10 15 10 9 6 520 30 20 17 12 10
Optimized
RESIST-1
– 3 2 2 2 1
Basic RESIST-0 10 29 19 16 11 1020 57 38 31 22 19
Optimized
RESIST-0
– 3 2 2 2 1
Figure 18: Analysis of the number of packets required for Hello message in the closest distance to
the sink.
vate keys for each token, Kkpub, and Kkpri. A token therefore occupies 85B.
Sensor must also keep space for signature operations (2KB). Nevertheless,
Challenge and ChallengeReply messages are shorter, and do not need
simultaneous free space.
• Optimized RESIST-0 uses the same encoding for messages as Optimized
RESIST-1. Relaying nodes require additional available memory to generate
next hop keys, i.e. 2KB for EC point multiplication. Note that the new
generated public key is forwarded to neighbors and it is not further needed.
As shown in Fig. 17, protocol optimizations reduce considerably the length of
tokens by means of hashing. Similarly, RESIST-0 estimations at relay nodes rep-
resent an upper bound due to the extra free memory required for signature genera-
tion (cf. S in Fig. 17) and verification (cf. V in Fig. 17) executed at the Challenge
stage.
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A.4. Estimation of Communication Cost
Using estimations on code size, cryptographic variables, and the performance
measurements included above, we now examine the effective data rates and the
consumption in the transmission of packets. As it has been shown in the literature,
transmission generally consumes more energy than computation. Packets sizes are
therefore an important parameter for WSN protocol design.
Since typical packet sizes on WSNs are 30 bytes and 56 bytes, and the highest
rate is 250 kbps for current generation of sensor platforms, we can estimate the
number of packets required by each protocol, for a network of 20 hops (2000
sensors) and an average of 45 bytes per packet (see Fig. 18 for a summary):
• Basic RESIST-1: Hello messages occupy 45 × R bytes when they are
sent by the sink: I.e., 45 × 20 bytes, for R = 20 according to the example.
Since one token is removed at each hop, the size decreases a lot during the
propagation of the message.
• Basic RESIST-0: Hello messages occupy 85×R bytes when they are sent
by the sink: I.e., 85×20 bytes, for R = 20 according to the example. Every
time one token is removed, the size decreases by two messages.
• Optimized RESIST-1 and Optimized RESIST-0: Hello messages have
a constant size of 84 bytes.The low communication cost is compensated by
a higher computational cost.
1IEEE 802.15.4 maximum packet size is defined as 127 bytes: MAC header (25 bytes), NWK
header (8 bytes) and DATA payload (94 bytes).
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